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SYMPOSIUM 
Beyond the Habitual Paths of Reasoning 
PADRAIG HOGAN 
National University of Ireland Maynooth, Ireland 
The phrase in the title comes from a passage on page 150 of Thinking Again. 
Employed by the authors in the course of an engagement with works of Kierkegaard 
and Derrida, it is also an apt phrase to give a suggestive summary of one of the chief 
themes in the book as a whole. The theme I have in mind here is really a twofold 
one: firstly, the book’s critique-largely an unsympathetic one-of those paths of 
reasoning associated with the modernist legacies of the Enlightenment and their 
educational embodiments; secondly its critique-a more sympathetic one-of post- 
modern moves to abandon the grand ideals and universalistic pretensions of the 
Enlightenment’s legacies. In this short contribution to the symposium I will concen- 
trate on these two critiques. 
T o  begin with the first critique, the authors point out that the Enlightenment’s 
most notable legacy to education is the displacement of one kind of search for 
foundations and its replacement with another kind. What gets unseated is a Platonist 
conception which views knowledge as that which had its foundations in a changeless 
metaphysical world of ideas [‘a transmundane realm of Forms’ (p. 23)]. What the 
rationalist tenor of Enlightenment thinking installs instead is a modernist conception 
which views knowledge as that which has its foundations in reason as something 
universal. This modemist orientation becomes articulated in philosophy as the 
reflective consciousness ‘critically examining its own limits and its own potential’ 
(p. 27). Pointing to the anti-traditionalist thrust of this shift, and more particularly 
to its educational implications, the authors write: 
Thus the conscious individual was the sovereign subject of knowledge. The 
strategic, ‘political’ value of this epistemic autonomy is in its legitimation of 
resistance to the ‘corrupting’ influence of ‘mere opinion’-the mere opin- 
ion of others which should not easily outweigh the evidence of one’s own 
experience or most rigorous and principled reflections. (p. 23) 
The authors also identify ‘the classic analytic philosophy of education elaborated by 
Peters and Hirst squarely within the modernist concern with secure foundations and 
the autonomy of reason. The following brief extracts from page 28 of Thinking Again 
illustrate this identification and trace its influence in three main emphases of that 
analytic philosophy: 
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Hirst’s Forms of Knowledge thesis clearly shares the same concern with the 
autonomy of differing kinds of intellectual pursuit . . . 
Peters’ Transcendental Argument may be seen as a modernist attempt to 
entrench educational theory as a partially autonomous discipline by estab- 
lishing the limits of value scepticism in the intellectual field. 
[Tlhe moral views of Hirst, Peters and their colleague Robert Dearden, 
which informed their views of both the educational process in general and 
moral education in particular, were grounded in an unambiguously mod- 
ernist view of the autonomy of ethics. 
The significance of their first critique now becomes apparent in the authors’ decisive 
rejection of the modernist tradition whose chief characteristics they have been 
sketching. The heart of this rejection lies in the claim that the search for foundations 
is a futile one; that epistemology cannot claim any special or disinterested status 
above the politics of competing perspectives. Thus a politics of knowledge becomes 
an inescapable fact of life for all ‘postfoundational philosophy’. The authors are 
acutely aware of the charge of relativism, or of ‘radical abrogation of intellectual 
responsibility’, which is made by traditionalist and modernist philosophers against 
any philosophy which rejects ‘the very notion of foundations of knowledge and with 
it that of the individual as the sovereign subject of knowledge’ (p. 24). 
The authors point out that despite allegations of subversion made by conserva- 
tives, it is the principled pursuit of the modernist project itself-the commitment to 
critique and the evaluation of claims to validity-that eventually discloses the 
elusiveness of foundations (p. 26). They also show moreover that most of the major 
currents of philosophical thought that developed during the twentieth century have 
given up the search for secure foundations, and must therefore be regarded as 
postfoundationalist. They include in this regard the later philosophy of Wittgenstein; 
the post-analytic philosophy of science pursued by Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend; 
much of the American pragmatist tradition from Dewey to Richard Rorty; the 
different strands of German philosophy associated with Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Habermas; and not least, in France, the poststructuralism of Foucault, the doncon- 
structionism of Derrida and the postmodern philosophy of Lyotard. The authors 
acknowledge, however, that for philosophy to repudiate the notion of foundations 
‘raises problems as to the legitimacy of all and any knowledge claims: problems 
which in turn prompt questions about the authority and autonomy of educational 
institutions in general’ (p. 24). 
The form of postfoundationalist philosophy which becomes the main subject of 
the second critique, pursued most notably in Chapter 5,  is postmodemist philoso- 
phy. Although the authors acknowledge early in the book (p. 5) that the philoso- 
phers they consider as postmodernists-Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Levinas-have 
mostly repudiated the description ‘postmodernist’, they argue that such philoso- 
phers can still be viewed as postmodernist thinkers in the sense that ‘they help us 
think about the postmodern condition in which we find ourselves’. The most notable 
common characteristic evident in the works of these four thinkers, according to the 
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authors of Thinking Again, is their contribution-in different ways-to a shift in the 
concept of ethics. In the case of Foucault the shift is evident in the ‘outlining [of] 
an ethos without a normative core’; in the case of Lyotard it becomes ‘a fractured 
vision of the social world as composed of a number of incommensurables’. The 
influence of Nietzsche strongly underlies both of these stances. With Derrida and 
Levinas, something more recondite is at play: in the case of Derrida, ‘a vision of the 
subject as more vigilant and responsive to the Other’; in the case of Levinas, ‘a 
conception of the Other as an anchorage for the command’ (of God) (p. 59). 
The second critique moves to the heart of its work with a summary exposition of 
some key themes in the philosophy of each of these four, followed by a critical review 
of the practical problems these philosophies still leave in the educators path. For 
instance, Foucault’s critique of powerknowledge is incisive and illuminating insofar 
as it goes, but it is a critique undertaken for the sake of what? There are some 
suggestive indications of this ‘what’ in Foucault’s last interviews (1984), but as far 
as explicit and positive practices are concerned, the authors correctly conclude that 
‘Foucault seems unwilling to recommend any alternative’. By contrast, the authors 
point out that the positive ethical demands at the heart of Levinas’ philosophy are 
of their nature so demanding that only saintly individuals may be able to live up to 
them. Lyotard is criticised by the authors for giving too much weight to the 
‘incommensurablility’ of different discourses, and thus for casting a disapproving eye 
from the start on the possibility of accommodations between many discourses 
(standpoints, traditions) which might be more inclusionary than exclusionary in 
character. For Lyotard, it would seem that all such accommodations are acts of 
violence (p. 70). 
Lyotard’s paths of reasoning play a stronger part in the book’s second critique, 
however, than do those of any of the other three. His explorations of ‘performativity’ 
and of its dominance in postmodern societies are a major inspiration of the authors’ 
criticisms of education reform policies of most countries in the English-speaking 
world in recent decades. Lyotard’s theses also feature prominently in the authors’ 
largely sympathetic critique of postmodernism. In this latter respect some of these 
theses escape a bit too lightly in my view. Let me explain this. Lyotard describes ‘the 
postmodern’ as an attitude of ‘incredulity to metanarratives’. When they speak 
unquestioningly of the ‘collapse of grand narrative’ (p. 102) the authors seem to me 
to acquiesce too readily in one of Lyotard’s more questionable conclusions. They 
seem to accept as an accomplished fact Lyotard’s indiscriminate rejection of ‘the 
dialectics of spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the working 
subject’. On my own view, there is something breathtakingly audacious in the scale 
of Lyotard’s dismissal here. If the target of the dismissal were primarily the 
teleological or historicist emphasis in the works of Hegel or Marx, it would be 
difficult to deny that Lyotard’s appraisal was broadly accurate as a conclusion about 
the philosophical temperaments of contemporary Western cultures. 
But Lyotard seems to be going much further than ridding Hegel and M a n  of 
teleological content. More subtly, he seems to be consigning the entire works of 
Hegel and Marx to the ranks of what must be considered passk in a postmodern age, 
and doing the same to most of the inheritances of Western philosophy. In other 
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words I am arguing that the sweeping force of Lyotard’s work harbours a tenden- 
tious purpose; one which I would be keen to see the authors investigate. Though 
ostensibly an investigation of the state of knowledge in advanced technological 
societies, The Postmodem Condition is as much a polemic against philosophers in the 
Enlightenment tradition as it is a ‘report on knowledge’. Its analysis receives an 
unwarranted force and impetus from Lyotard’s inhospitality to some of the more 
central figures in the traditions springing from the Enlightenment, including not 
only such early champions of modernity as Humboldt and Schleiermacher, but also 
later ones like Habermas. 
Where the philosophy of education is concerned, the consequences of such a 
stance for constructive action would seem to be debilitating ones. It is difficult to see 
in education after postmodernism-u la Lyotard-anything which would equal in 
importance the Nietzschean-inspired task of a sustained confrontation with inheri- 
tances of learning. These inheritances would now be chiefly significant as examples 
of a knowledge pervaded by hegemonic preconceptions. Unlike the shift from 
Nietzsche evident in Foucault’s final works and interviews, or the ‘messianic’ motifs 
in the later works of Derrida, Lyotard’s answer to the practical question ‘critique for 
the sake of what?’ seems confined to renewing the search for dissent, i.e. ‘paralogy’, 
or to bearing witness to ‘differends’ within and between different ‘language games’. 
The authors of Thinking Again criticise Lyotard’s exclusive embrace of paralogy as 
a way of resisting performativity. They perceptively point out that whatever about 
the merits of ‘paralogy’ in the conduct of a language game such as science, Lyotard 
neglects to recognise Wittgenstein’s distinction between the concept of ‘language 
games’ on the one hand and the more inclusive concept of ‘forms of life’ on the 
other (e.g. public education), within which language games of many kinds are 
themselves experienced. 
I would be keen to see the authors explore this line of argument further, with a 
view to sketching some outlines-albeit provisional ones-for defensible educational 
practice. By ‘outlines’ then, I mean something more concrete than what is contained 
in the ‘Prospect’ at the end, but I do not mean something that is universal in any a 
priori sense. Rather I mean candidates for engaging the productive thoughts and 
actions of teachers; candidates that aspire to be universally worthy of the commit- 
ments of teachers. I believe my own keenness here would be shared by hard-pressed 
teachers in many post-reform circumstances who are struggling, less to construct 
their selves than to redefine those solidarities of teaching and learning that constitute 
the integrity of their work. Let me conclude by suggesting that the paths of reasoning 
that will advance the practical heart of this work are likely to find their best 
inspirations elsewhere than in the more individualist of Nietzsche’s legacies. 
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